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ABSTRACT
Cryptography is the means to ensure data confidentiality, integrity and authentication in wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs). To use cryptography effectively however, the cryptographic keys need 
to be managed properly. First of all, the necessary keys need to be distributed to the nodes before 
the  nodes are deployed in the field,  in  such a way that  any two or more  nodes that  need to 
communicate securely can establish a session key. Then, the session keys need to be refreshed 
from time to time to prevent birthday attacks. Finally, in case any of the nodes is found to be 
compromised, the key ring of the compromised node needs to be revoked and some or all of the 
compromised keys might need to be replaced. These processes, together with the policies and 
techniques needed to support them, are called key management. The facts that  WSNs (1) are 
generally not tamper-resistant; (2) operate unattended; (3) communicate in an open medium; (4) 
have no fixed infrastructure and pre-configured topology; (5) have severe hardware and resource 
constraints, present unique challenges to key management. In this article, we explore techniques 
for meeting these challenges. What distinguishes our approach from a routine literature survey is 
that, instead of comparing various known schemes, we set out to identify the basic cryptographic 
principles, or building blocks that will allow practitioners to set up their own key management 
framework using these building blocks. 
INTRODUCTION
A WSN key management scheme consists of three main components: (1) key establishment; (2) 
key refreshment; (3) key revocation. Key establishment is about creating a  session key between 
the parties  that  need to communicate securely with each other.  Key refreshment  prolongs the 
effective lifetime of a cryptographic key, whereas key revocation ensures that an evicted node is 
no  longer  to  able  to  decipher  the  sensitive  messages  that  are  transmitted  in  the  network.  A 
thorough understanding of what role these components play and how they integrate with each 
other is crucial to the design of key management frameworks. Just as importantly, the design has 
to follow these WSN-specific guidelines:
Design Principle 1Favor computation over communication: In general, we do not mind doing a 
little bit more computation just to save a few transmissions, as communication is three orders 
of magnitude more expensive than computation.
Design Principle 2Minimal public-key cryptography: Public-key algorithms remain prohibitively 
expensive  on  sensor  nodes  both  in  terms  of  storage  and  energy.  The  use  of  public-key 
cryptography should be kept to a minimum, if necessary at all.
Design Principle 3Resilience: Severe hardware and energy constraint suggests that security should 
never  be  overdone  –  on  the  contrary,  tolerance  is  generally  preferred  to  overaggressive 
prevention. This reasoning leads us to design key management schemes that, instead of trying 
to be perfectly secure, aim to be resilient.
Our goal in this article is to identify and introduce, based on these guidelines and the state of the 
art in the literature, key management building blocks for WSNs.
An  aspect  of  key  management  that  is  often  overlooked  in  the  WSN literature  is  the  formal 
verification of cryptographic protocols, that is, the use of formal methods in mathematics to prove 
or disprove the correctness of these protocols. In protocol verification, the two most important 
properties to verify are secrecy and authentication. However, these problems are well-known to be 
undecidable (there is no way to tell whether the property is valid) if we assume the intruder can 
construct an infinite number of messages, or if there can be an unbounded number of parallel 
sessions  (i.e.,  parallel  executions  of  the  same  protocol).  One  approach  to  make  the  problem 
decidable is to limit the number of parallel sessions. Much of the work that uses this strategy is 
based on constraint solving. Our secondary goal in this article is to give a primer on protocol 
verification via constraint solving, in the hope that protocol verification will become an integrated 
step in the design of key management schemes for WSNs in the future.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. As preliminaries, we will first introduce the notation 
for  specifying  cryptographic  protocols.  We  will  then  discuss  protocol  verification  by  using 
constraint  solving.  We  will  then  introduce  the  building  blocks  in  the  three  areas:  key 
establishment,  key  refreshment  and key  revocation.  All  protocols  mentioned in  the  course  of 
discussion will be verified using constraint solving. Finally, we will give a brief conclusion.
NOTATION FOR PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION
The notation in Table 1 is used to specify cryptographic protocols for the rest of this article.
Symbols Meaning
A, B, … Usually represent node A, B, …
NA, NB, … Usually represent a nonce (random number) generated by A, B, …
KAB Usually represents a key shared between A and B
E(K, M) Encryption of message M using key K
MAC(K, M) Message authentication code (MAC) of message M using key K
PRF(K, M) Pseudorandom function with key K applied to plaintext M
|| Concatenation operator
K’ New key for replacing K during re-keying
Table 1. Notation for specifying cryptographic protocols
It is important to note that when both E(K, M) and MAC(K, M) appear in the same message, the 
encryption actually uses a sub-key generated from K, and the MAC uses another sub-key, also 
generated from K. For example, given a pseudorandom function PRF(⋅,⋅) and a master key K, the 
encryption sub-key can be derived as PRF(K, 1), whereas the MAC sub-key can be derived as 
PRF(K,  2).  The reason for not  using  K directly  is  that  some cipher operation modes like the 
popular CBC are susceptible to birthday attacks: if we use the same key to transform more than 
O(2m/2) plaintexts, it becomes likely that two or more of these plaintexts might map to the same 
ciphertext,  allowing  data  forgery  to  occur.  We  say  O(2m/2)  is  the  birthday  threshold.  Using 
different  sub-keys  for  encryption and for  authentication allows us  to  process  more  plaintexts 
before reaching the birthday threshold. Also, unforeseen problems may arise if the same key is 
used for encryption and authentication.
PROTOCOL VERIFICATION
A number of formal methods can be used for protocol verification, depending on the restriction we 
impose on the attacker model. If we limit the number of parallel sessions, we can model a protocol 
using  the  strand  space  model ,  and  use  constraint  solving  to  verify  its  security  properties 
efficiently. The strand space model can be understood informally as a mapping of the notions on 
the first column of Table 2, to the notions on the second column of Table 2.
Protocol Strand space model Example
Role: What a principal does in 
the protocol
Strand: A sequence of events Initiator, responder, server
Complete  run:  A  complete 
iteration of the protocol
Bundle:  A  set  of  strands   
legitimate  or  otherwise   
hooked  together  where  one 
strand  sends  a  message  and 
another  receives  that  same 
message, that represents a full 
protocol exchange
1. Initiator → Attacker: …
2. Attacker → Responder: …
3. Responder → Attacker: …
4. Attacker → Initiator: …
Table 2．The strand space model
Basically, a protocol consists of roles that exchange messages with each other, and the messages 
that ‘fly’ back and forth between the roles can be visualized as  strands. A bundle is basically a 
bunch of interleaving strands. A  system scenario is a hypothetical instantiation of the protocol 
between some specified  principals  with  a  specified  outcome.  For  example,  we  can  specify  a 
system scenario where the principals include one initiator, one responder, one server; we can then 
define their roles, and specify the outcome as the attacker getting the session key  all of these 
are our constraints. If we can find a bundle that satisfies these constraints, then we can say the 
protocol does not satisfy the secrecy requirement. Note the fact that a bundle cannot be infinite 
means we cannot model infinite number of parallel sessions. In WSNs, we are mainly after these 
three security requirements:
 Secrecy: A session key must only be known to the communicating nodes.
 Authentication (implies integrity): A key establishment protocol must end with every party 
properly authenticating the other parties it is communicating with. In other words, it must be 
impossible for any intruder  M to impersonate another node A whose keys (used in the key 
establishment protocol) M does not have.
 Replay  resistance:  The  meaning  of  replay  attack  on  a  role  R is  the  possibility  of 
unauthenticated  parties  to  cause  R to  run,  i.e.  for  R to  process  replayed  messages.  If  R 
happens to maintain the states of every run, then it would be maintaining the incorrect states. 
The beauty of this approach is that it can easily be implemented using Prolog. One example is 
CoProVe (http://wwwes.cs.utwente.nl/coprove). All the protocols that are given in this article in 
standard notation have been verified using CoProVe.
KEY ESTABLISHMENT
We start with the first component of key management: key establishment. In precise terms, key 
establishment is a process or protocol whereby a shared secret key becomes available to two or 
more  parties,  for  subsequent  cryptographic  use.  There  are  two  types  of  key  establishment 
protocols:
1. key  transport,  where one party  creates  or  otherwise obtains  a  secret  value,  and securely 
transfers it to the other(s); and
2. key agreement, where two or more parties derive a shared secret as a function of information 
contributed  by,  or  associated  with,  each  of  the  parties,  (ideally)  such  that  no  party  can 
predetermine the resulting value.
A key pre-distribution protocol is a key agreement protocol whereby the resulting established keys 
are completely determined a priori by initial keying material. Key pre-distribution is essential to 
WSNs because (1) it minimizes the exchange of information, i.e., communication; (2) it does not 
require any key distribution center (KDC). However, as we shall see, key pre-distribution is not 
the only key establishment technique used in WSNs, because due to the resource constraints of 
sensor nodes, we can rarely pre-distribute enough keying material such that any pair of nodes 
would be able to establish a session key. We will look at some key pre-distribution schemes later.
In WSNs, key establishment is required to support these basic communication modes: (1) global 
broadcast,  or  flooding;  (2)  local  broadcast;  (3)  unicast.  Hence,  we  will  discuss  the  key 
establishment protocols in the context of supporting these communication modes. Note that for 
each mode, we can in theory either use symmetric-key cryptography or public-key cryptography, 
but we are honoring  by restricting ourselves to using symmetric-key cryptography. The following 
discusses how key establishment can be done to support the three basic communication modes.
Global broadcast
In doing a global broadcast, a node (sender) intends to broadcast a message to all other nodes 
(receivers)  in  the  network.  The  security  objective  is  to  ensure  the  integrity,  authenticity  and 
optionally the confidentiality of the messages from the sender to the receivers. The sender cannot 
share a key with all  the receivers, because then any of the receivers can forge messages. The 
sender also cannot share a different key with each of the receivers, because this solution is not 
scalable. Instead, the standard solution for integrity and authentication is  µTESLA (the “micro” 
version of the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authentication Protocol) .
Figure 1. Keys are released according to a schedule in SPINS
To bootstrap the protocol, the sender first generates a one-way key chain (K0,  K1, …, Kn), where 
Ki+1 =  h(Ki),  i = 0,…,n-1 and  h(  )  is  a  collision-resistant hash function (i.e.,  a  one-way hash 
function that is also collision-resistant), and distributes the root of the key chain Kn to the receivers 
securely. Kn is called the commitment of the key chain. For this protocol to work, the clocks of the 
sender and the receivers must be synchronized. The sender and the receivers divide time into 
intervals. If during time interval i, the sender broadcasts a message Mi, the sender appends Mi with 
a Message Authentication Code (MAC) of Mi generated with Ki. The receivers cannot authenticate 
Mi until  δ intervals  later,  when  the  sender  would  broadcast  Ki. (Figure  1).  The  receivers 
successfully authenticate the sender if Ki+j = hj(Ki), where Ki+j  is the key released in time interval i-
j (j can be any value between δ and n-i, assuming n-i > δ). Note that the keys are released in the 
reverse order, because an attacker cannot re-generate the key chain in the reverse order due to the 
“one-wayness” of collision-resistant hash functions. 
Since keys are distributed along with messages, µTESLA by itself cannot provide confidentiality. 
In this respect, a global key is usually used alongside µTESLA to provide data confidentiality.
Local broadcast
In doing a local broadcast, a node (sender) intends to broadcast a message to all its neighbors 
(receivers).  The  security  objective  is  to  ensure  the  integrity,  authenticity  and  optionally  the 
confidentiality of the messages from the sender to the receivers. As before, we may use µTESLA 
to provide integrity and authentication, and a  cluster key (a key shared between a node and its 
neighbors)  to  provide  confidentiality.  Alternatively,  we  may  relax  the  time  synchronization 
requirement, because the receivers are just one hop away from the sender. The following protocol 
to be described is originally designed for passive participation  a data communication paradigm 
in which a node would suppress its own transmission if it overhears its neighbor(s) transmitting 
similar data. This alternative protocol is essentially µTESLA, used with a cluster key, but without 
a key disclosure schedule. In this protocol, the sender distributes, as in µTESLA, a commitment of 
its  key  chain,  and  additionally  a  cluster  key  to  the  receivers  (which  are  also  the  sender’s 
neighbors) . The rationale behind using this key combination is as follows:
 if only the key chain is used, the keys in the key chain would have to be broadcast in the 
clear, and in the absence of time interval differentiation, a cluster-outsider would be able to 
forge messages using these keys;
 if only the cluster key is used, authentication of the sender cannot be achieved;
 but if used together, the cluster key can be used to encrypt messages as well as hide the key 
chain keys from cluster-outsiders; and at the same time, the key chain keys can be used for 
authentication.
The disadvantage of this protocol is that a malicious insider is still able to forge messages to other 
receivers. Note that this protocol is not suitable for global broadcasts because a global broadcast 
travels more than one hop, and the lack of time intervals allows a malicious upstream receiver to 
forge messages to downstream receivers.
Unicast
Unicast is one-to-one communication. The security objective is to ensure the integrity, authenticity 
and optionally confidentiality of  the messages exchanged between two communicating nodes. 
Denote the two nodes by  A and  B. We only deal with the case where  A and  B are neighbors, 
because when A and B are multiple hops away, we can usually secure one hop at a time. Our goal 
is to establish a session key between A and B, which in the WSN literature is called a pairwise key.
Random key pre-distribution The prevalent strategy for establishing pairwise keys is random 
key pre-distribution (RKP) (aka probabilistic key sharing). The general idea is to prepare a pool of 
keying material, called the key pool; and to each sensor node, distribute a random fixed-size subset 
of keying material from the key pool. The keying material belonging to a node is called the node’s 
key ring. Denote the key pool size as P and key ring size as K. Having potentially different subsets 
of the key pool, two neighboring nodes can only establish a pairwise key at a certain probability 
that is related to  P and  K;  that is,  a node may not be  securely connected to all  its neighbors. 
However by adjusting  P  and  K, it is possible to make a network securely connected with high 
probability.
In RKP, this is how two nodes establish a session key: When a node is added to the network, the 
node initiates  shared-key discovery, by broadcasting a list of identifiers that identify the keys it 
has. The neighbors reply with their lists of key identifiers. By comparing the lists, the new node 
and its neighbors discover what key(s) they share. Session keys are then derived from the shared 
key(s), for example, by applying a PRF on the XOR of the shared key(s). The disadvantage of this 
approach is that it allows an attacker to find out which keys a node is holding, giving room to the 
attacker  to  attack strategically.  An alternative  approach is,  instead of  picking keying material 
randomly for a node, to pick the keying material according to the result of a PRF. For example, 
the key index of node A’s i-th key is given by PRF(A, i). Using this approach, a node can by just 
knowing the ID of its neighbor, determine the indexes of its neighbor’s keys.
Different variants of RKP can be instantiated depending on what we use as ‘keying material’:
 Symmetric key : The simplest case is to use a single symmetric key as keying material. In 
this case, every node is imprinted with K keys chosen at random from a key pool of size P. 
When a node A is compromised, A’s keys may be used to compromise other secure channels 
that  do  not  involve  A,  since  the  keys  might  be  stored  in  some other  nodes  outside  A’s 
communication range as well.
 Polynomial  :  In  this  case,  the  key  pool  consists  of  P symmetric  t-degree  bivariate 
polynomials  over  a  finite  field  q,  i.e.,  a  pool  of  polynomials  of  the  form 
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= ∑  with  aij = aji;  aij,  x,  y  ∈ q; and  q is a prime chosen to be much 
larger  than  the  number  of  nodes  as  well  as  the  desired  key  length.  Denote  this  set  of 
polynomials by {f1(x, y),...,fP(x, y)}. Every node A is then imprinted with K polynomial shares 
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f A y f A y ,  by  choosing  different  i1,  i2,  ...,  iK  randomly  from {1,...,P}.  By 
shared-key discovery, node A and B can find out which polynomials they have in common. If 
that polynomial is f1(x, y), then without loss of generality, A and B can establish a session key 
with each other by calculating the key as f1 (A, B), and as f1 (B, A) respectively. When a node 
A is  compromised,  A’s  polynomial  shares  1 ( , ),..., ( , )Ki if A y f A y  can  only  be  used  to 
compromise secure channels that involve A, unless the attacker manages to compromise t+1 
shares of one of the shared polynomials.
 Matrix : In this case, the key pool consists of P matrices M1, M2, ..., MP of size N×(t+1) over 
finite field q, where N is the expected total number of nodes in the network; t is a security 
parameter; and q is a prime chosen to be much larger than N as well as the desired key length. 
The  matrices  are  generated  in  three  steps:  First,  a  Vandermonde-like  matrix  G of  size 
(t+1)×N over  finite  field  q is  generated  using  a  primitive  element  s of  q:
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At the second step,  P random symmetric  matrices  D1,  D2,  ...,  DP of  size  (t+1)×(t+1) are 
generated.  Thirdly  and  finally,  the  final  matrices  are  calculated  as  M1 =  (D1·G)T,  M2 = 
(D2·G)T, ...,  MP = (DP·G)T.  G has the following useful properties: (1) since  s is a primitive 
element and N<q, s, s2, …, sN are all unique and can be used as the nodes’ IDs; (2) any t+1 
columns of  G are linearly independent. The following are what get distributed to the  j-th 
node: (1) the j-th column of G，denoted G(j); (2) the j-th row from each of 1 2, ,..., Ki i iM M M
, denoted 1 2( ), ( ),..., ( )Ki i iM j M j M j , where different i1, i2, ..., iK are randomly chosen from 
{1,...,P}. Therefore in theory, each node has to store 1 matrix column and K matrix rows; but 
in practice, each node only has to store the 2nd element of its assigned column and K matrix 
rows, because all elements of the same column are just different powers of the 2nd element 
of the column. For example, the 1st node only has to store s, the 2nd node only has to store s2 
and so on. By shared-key discovery, node i and j can find out which matrices they have in 
common. If that matrix is M1, then without loss of generality, i and j can establish a session 
key with each other by calculating the key as M1(i)G(j), and as M1(j)G(i) respectively. Note 
that M1G = GTD1TG is symmetric, hence M1(i)G(j) = (M1G)ij = (M1G)ji = M1(j)G(i), i.e., node i 
and node j are able to derive the same session key. When node j is compromised, node j’s 
matrix rows  1 2( ), ( ),..., ( )Ki i iM j M j M j can only be used to compromise secure channels 
that  involve  node  j,  unless  the  attacker  manages  to  compromise  t+1  rows  of 
1 2
 or  or ... or 
Ki i i
M M M , because any  t+1 rows of  1 2 or  or ... or Ki i iM M M are linearly 
independent. This technique is actually inspired by maximum distance separable code.
We now consider the case where A and B do not share any key, but each has a secure link to a 
common neighbor S. In this case, A and B can still establish a session key through S acting as a 
trusted third party. The following key transport protocol can be used to establish a session key KAB 
between A and B via S:
1. A → S: NA || B || MAC(KAS, NA || B)
2. S → A: E(KAS, E(KBS, NS || KAB)) || MAC(KAS, NA || B || E(KBS, NS || KAB))
3. A → B: A || E(KBS, NS)
4. B → S: B || NB || A || MAC(KBS, NS || B || NB || A)
5. S → B: E(KBS, KAB) || MAC(KBS, NB || A || E(KBS, KAB))
6. B → A: Ack, MAC(KAB, Ack)
This protocol has been verified with CoProVe to be (1) secure with respect to the secrecy of KAB, 
(2) secure in the mutual authentication between A and B, and (3) secure against replay attacks on S 
.
LEAP+ An alternative scheme to RKP, as part of LEAP+ , is as follows:
1. First, embed an initial key KIN in every node.
2. Upon bootstrapping, every node A derives its own master key as KA = PRF(KIN, A), and set its 
timer to fire at time Tmin later. Tmin is the estimated minimum amount of time for an attacker to 
compromise a node. A sends out a HELLO message containing its ID.
3. As long as the timer has not fired, if  A hears a HELLO message from a neighbor B, it will 
derive the pairwise key as  KBA = PRF(PRF(KIN,  A),  B). If  B receives A’s HELLO message 
first, then the pairwise key would be KAB = PRF(PRF(KIN, B), A) instead.
4. When the timer fires, KIN is erased from memory.
This scheme is however only useful for static networks, since after  KIN  is erased, a node can no 
longer derive pairwise keys. 
EBS Exclusion Basis Systems (EBS) is a variation of the symmetric-key version of RKP . 
Basically, instead of choosing K out of P keys at random, EBS chooses K out of P keys uniquely 
for  each  node,  so  there  are  only  P!/[K!(P-K)!]  ways  of  choosing,  and  there  can  only  be  a 
maximum of P!/[K!(P-K)!] nodes. By picking K > P/2, EBS makes sure every pair of nodes share 
at least one key, hence guaranteeing the network is connected. The drawback of this scheme is 
that, when a node is compromised, only P-K keys, or less than half of the keys in the key pool 
remain  intact.  Because  of  this,  a  WSN that  uses  EBS is  most  often  compartmentalized  into 
clusters, with a different key pool assigned to each cluster. 
KEY REFRESHMENT
As mentioned,  different  sub-keys  are  used  for  encryption and for  authentication because  that 
would allow the birthday threshold to be reached more slowly, but the birthday threshold will 
eventually be reached. The standard solution to further delay the birthday threshold from being 
reached is key refreshment, i.e., the process of refreshing shared secrets periodically as a mean to 
increase the birthday threshold (the cryptography literature generally uses ‘key refreshment’ and 
‘re-keying’  interchangeably,  but  we  reserve  ‘re-keying’  for  the  process  that  follows  key 
revocation). There are two mainstream approaches :
1. Parallel re-keying: We start with keys Kenc,0 and Kmac,0. The i-th (i = 1, 2, ...) refreshed keys 
are PRF(Kenc,0,  i) and PRF(Kmac,0,  i). Note:  Kenc,0  and Kmac,0  can be generated from the same 
master key K0 via PRF(K0, 1) and PRF(K0, 2).
2. Serial re-keying: We start with key K0. The 1st refreshed keys are PRF(K0, 1) and PRF(K0, 2), 
respectively  for  encryption  and  MAC.   The  i-th  (i  =  2,  3,  ...)  refreshed  keys  are 
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respectively for encryption and MAC.
The advantage of using these approaches is as follows. Suppose the key length is k. If the session 
key is not refreshed, the birthday threshold is 2k/2. If the session key is refreshed every 2k/3 function 
invocations (where ‘function’ is either encryption or MAC), the session key can be refreshed 2k/3 
times  before  birthday  attack  is  likely  to  succeed.  In  other  words,  the  birthday  threshold  is 
increased from 2k/2 to 22k/3.
For WSNs, serial re-keying is preferred, because in parallel re-keying, the counter i and the key K0 
have to be stored, and if a node is compromised, these information would allow an attacker to 
generate  all  past  keys  in  addition to  future  keys.  In  other  words,  parallel  re-keying does not 
provide  forward  security.  On  the  other  hand,  in  serial  re-keying,  only  the  term 
0
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i i
K
−
1 4 2 4 3 1 2 3  needs  to  be  stored,  and  this  does  not  allow  any  past  key  to  be 
generated due to the non-invertibility of PRF.
KEY REVOCATION AND RE-KEYING
Key revocation is the process of removing keys from operational  use prior to their  originally 
scheduled expiry, for reasons such as node capture. When a node is found to be compromised, a 
key revocation list is constructed and broadcast using  µTESLA to the whole network. The list 
contains the ID of the compromised node, and optionally the indexes of the node’s keys  these 
keys are keys from the key pool, and there is a mechanism for calculating these indexes based on 
the  node  ID as  described  previously,  so  storing  the  key  indexes  is  optional.  The  process  of 
removing keys is usually accompanied by re-keying. Because of this, the main challenge for doing 
key revocation efficiently is to do re-keying efficiently. Let us consider the types of keys that need 
to be replaced in case of a key revocation:
1. Global broadcast keys: In the context of µTESLA, the key chain commitments that reside in 
the nodes do not need to be replaced, because all the nodes do is to wait for new keys from 
the key chain to be disclosed anyway. On the other hand, the global key needs to be replaced.
2. Local broadcast keys: Similarly, only the cluster key needs to be replaced. 
3. Unicast keys: There are two scenarios: either the revoked keys are only used for the secure 
channels that involve the evicted node(s), or the keys might actually be used elsewhere in the 
network for  the secure channels  that  do not  involve the  evicted node(s)  at  all.  The first 
scenario applies to LEAP+ , the polynomial-based  and matrix-based  RKP schemes, whereas 
the second scenario applies to EBS  and the symmetric-key-based RKP scheme  because a 
key in these schemes is potentially shared by nodes distributed all over the network (all these 
schemes are mentioned in the last section). For EBS, re-keying is essential, because every 
node contains more than half of the keys from the key pool. For symmetric-key-based RKP, 
re-keying is less urgent, because in this case, a node’s key ring is typically much smaller than 
the key pool size. Therefore, as long as the compromised keys from the key pool (“pool 
keys”  for  short)  are  properly  revoked,  the  network  should  only  suffer  from  reduced 
connectivity (counting only secure links). 
Now the types of keys to be replaced are known, the next issue to consider is how the new keys 
are generated and transported to the target nodes. At first sight, it seems that to renew the global 
key,  there is a vast  amount of literature on  secure group communication that  we can borrow 
techniques from. However, these techniques do not translate well to WSNs, mainly because they 
do not consider the multi-hop transportation of the new keys to the nodes. Furthermore, for WSNs, 
the logical first step is to renew the compromised pool keys, because the pool keys are used to 
derive pairwise keys, and the pairwise keys in turn are used to transport other keys. The following 
describes the procedures:
 The new pool keys can either be generated centrally or in a distributed fashion . In the latter 
case, some nodes are tasked with the generation of certain keys, e.g. the i-th node generates 
the  i-th pool key. Either way, the problem is getting the new keys to the right nodes. As 
mentioned, re-keying is essential for EBS. When a node is compromised, P-K out of P keys 
in the key pool remain secure, and all uncompromised nodes must have at least one of these 
P-K keys (this is not the case for RKP!). Suppose without loss of generality the compromised 
keys are K1,..,Km. For each intact key Ki (i = m+1,…,P), the message E(Ki, E(K1, K1’) || … || 
E(Km, Km’)) is generated, and µTESLA-broadcast to the network. Every node will then be able 
to replace their compromised keys and derive new pairwise keys. On the other hand, for 
symmetric-key-based RKP, re-keying is not crucial, and is actually not efficient to execute.
 The new cluster keys are generated by the nodes themselves. After setting up a pairwise key 
with a neighbor, a node transmits its cluster key to the neighbor, encrypted using the new 
pairwise key. 
 The new global key is generated centrally and subsequently broadcast to the network. The 
generator does the following : 
1. The generator generates the new global key as Kg’.
2. The generator broadcasts the hash of  Kg’,  h(Kg’), to the network using  µTESLA. Every 
node in the network caches h(Kg’). This hash will be used later to verify Kg’.
3. The  generator  broadcasts  Kg’  to  its  neighbors  encrypted  with  its  cluster  key.  The 
neighbors individually verify  Kg’ with the hash  h(Kg’) they have received earlier. The 
generator’s neighbors then re-encrypt Kg’ with their own cluster keys and broadcast the 
re-encrypted  Kg’ to their respective neighbors. The process continues until  Kg’ reaches 
every  node  in  the  network.  This  flooding  process  can  be  made  more  efficient,  by 
optimizing the underlying routing protocol, but the principle remains the same.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this article, we introduce the key management building blocks for WSNs based on a clear set of 
design guidelines and the state of the art in the literature. Along with our discussion, we stress the 
importance of protocol verification, giving one sample protocol that has been verified. Future key 
management  architectures  can  be  designed  based  on  these  building  blocks.  Integrating  these 
components however is a challenging task, as there are many aspects to consider. For example, an 
energy-efficient  key management  architecture  should  be  optimized for  the  underlying routing 
protocol and vice versa. Secure data aggregation also needs to be taken into account. Meanwhile, 
existing building blocks can be further improved. In fact, the polynomial and matrix technique in 
random key pre-distribution can be further generalized; and re-keying for symmetric-key-based 
random key  pre-distribution is  actually  a  difficult  problem.  Mostly  importantly,  the  perpetual 
quest is to lower the resource requirements of key management.
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